SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
The legal picture in the State of New Jersey has undergone
marked changes within the past year. Both the judiciary and the
legislature have contributed to noted developments, particularlyin
such areas as Criminal Law and Procedure, Constitutional Law,
and Family Law. In the interests of brevity and clarity, the Seton
Hall Law Review will attempt to present a convenient synopsis of
some of these noteworthy developments. In so doing, we hope to
aid and assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of
the more interesting changes in certain significant areas of practice.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1978 N.J. Laws ch. 67 (to be codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14F-1 to -16 (West Cum. Supp. 19791980)).
The New Jersey State Legislature has established the Office of
Administrative Law (Office), an independent arm of the executive
branch of the state government. The legislation establishes for the
first time in the state an Office of Administrative Law (Office). Functions which were previously in the domain of the state's Division of
Administrative Procedure have been transferred to the Office. The
Director of the Office is given the authority to develop uniform standards for administrative hearings, to coordinate the administration of
the state's Administrative Procedure Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
52:14B-1 to -15 (West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (APA), and to
assist individual agencies in the implementation and interpretation of
rules promulgated pursuant to the APA.
Although the office is allocated within the Department of State,
the independent nature of the newly created Office is emphasized.
The Director of the Office is vested with broad powers to facilitate
the transition and continued operation of the office. One example of
the type of function transferred to the Office is the provision that
rules adopted by the individual state agencies become effective upon
their filing with the Director. Previously, such rules had been required to be filed with the Secretary of State.
By providing for the appointment of a network of administrative
law judges, the Act establishes a group of individuals competent to
resolve contested cases that may arise before the individual agencies.
In establishing an Office of Administrative Law, the New Jersey State
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Legislature has taken cognizance of the need for an independent,
central force to direct the implementation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
BANKS AND BANKING-InfoComp Corp. v. Somerset Trust Co.
and STC Corp., 165 N.J. Super. 382, 398 A.2d 557 (App. Div.
1979).
InfoComp, a New Jersey corporation whose principal business
location is Mount Laurel, has provided various data processing services to governmental bodies and agencies in its area since its incorporation in 1969. These activities comprise ninety percent of InfoComp's business, and include the preparation of real property tax
assessments, tax bills, water and sewer assessments, voter registration
records and jury lists. Somerset Trust Company (Somerset), a New
Jersey bank whose offices are wholly within Somerset County, has
solicited data processing business and provided local governmental
bodies with data processing services since 1966. These activities include essentially the same service as those marketed by InfoComp.
Of the services provided by the respective parties, the compilation of
real property tax assessment records is the primary source of competition, the contracts for which are awarded on the basis of bids.
InfoComp unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the federal
comptroller of the currency to prevent a competitor bank from offering data processing services. InfoComp maintained that the data processing business of Somerset and other banking institutions were outside the parameters of permissible banking activity under N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:9A-1 (West 1963 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Nevertheless,
the commissioner of banking also refused InfoComp's request to restrain Somerset's actions. Consequently, InfoComp sought a permanent injunction to prevent Somerset and its affiliate, STC Corporation,
from engaging in the data processing business. Prior to trial, Somerset's motion for dismissal and InfoComp's summary judgment motion
were both denied. Upon completion of the plaintiff's case, the court
dismissed the complaint, holding that InfoComp had failed to prove a
cause of action. The plaintiff appealed.
The pivotal issue involved was whether New Jersey law permits
state chartered banks to engage in the data processing business. The
resolution of this "important question of public policy" necessitated a
definitive interpretation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-24(a) (West 1963
& Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). This section of the Banking Act (Act) con-
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strues "bank services" to include the "preparation and mailing of
checks, statements, notices, and similar items, or any other clerical,
bookkeeping, accounting, statistical, or similar functions .... . Id.
The appellate division, in an expansive construction of the Act, affirmed the chancery court's judgment. The court maintained that the
electronic maintenance of real estate, water and sewer tax records is a
"clerical," "bookkeeping" or "accounting" activity, and thus permissible under the Act. 165 N.J. Super. at 388, 398 A.2d at 560.
InfoComp contended that the trial judge should have applied the
ejusdem generis rule to the disputed language of the enactment.
However, the court asserted that the rule's applicability was subordinate to a statutory construction consistent with legislative intent.
See Union County Bd. of Freeholders v. Union County Park
Comm'n, 41 N.J. 333, 337, 196 A.2d 781, 783 (1964); Salomon v.
Jersey City, 12 N.J. 379, 389, 97 A.2d 405, 410 (1953). The court
held that the language contained within the Act evinced a specific
legislative desire to authorize banks to provide the disputed data processing services. 165 N.J. Super. at 389, 398 A.2d at 560. The court
also averred that further evidence of the legislature's intent to allow
for statutory flexibility was found in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-24.4
(West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) which affords the commissioner of
banking discretion to fashion a broad definition of "bank services."
Finally, the appellate court indicated that unlike the Federal Bank
Services Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976), the New Jersey
statute lacks the provision that bank services be restricted to those
performed for banking institutions. 165 N.J. Super. at 391, 398 A.2d
at 561.
Although the InfoComp court has validly construed N.J.. STAT.
ANN. § 17:9A-24. 1(a) to encompass data processing services, the legislation's nebulous language will undoubtedly prompt additional litigation in the area of acceptable bank activities. This broader problem
has not been and cannot be resolved by the determination made
here. Thus, reevaluation of this section by the state legislature may
be necessary. As a matter of public policy, flexibility in the adaptation
of technological advances in the banking industry should be encouraged. The InfoComp decision, however, goes well beyond this proposition and legitimately expands the scope of permissible banking
activities. Unless the legislature takes the initiative to restrict the provision by employing more specific language, the InfoComp determination will certainly serve as the basis upon which future expansion of
bank activities will be validated.
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CASINO CONTROL-N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
On March 17, 1978, the New Jersey legislature amended the
Casino Control Act to further the aims of continuity and stability in
casino gaming operations. The amendments allow the Casino Control
Commission (Commission) to grant temporary casino permits and to
appoint a conservator to control the property of a casino licensee
under certain circumstances.
Section 5:12-95.1 authorizes the granting of temporary casino
permits upon a formal request by the applicant. There must also be
an affirmative finding by the Commission that, inter alia, the statements of compliance pursuant to section 5:12-81 have been issued to
the applicant and that a voting trust agreement in accordance with
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-20 (West 1969) has been executed and deposited with the Commission. The voting trust agreement becomes
effective at the discretion of the Commission based upon certain
enumerated criteria. When a temporary casino permit is granted, it is
effective for a period of six months. It is then renewable for one
three-month period at the Commission's discretion. During the
period that a temporary casino permit is in effect, the Commission
and the Division of Gaming Enforcement shall conduct an investigation in order to make a final determination on the application for a
casino license.
Section 5:12-130.1 provides for the institution of conservatorship
and appointment of conservators in a summary manner by the Commission. This action is authorized where: (1) a casino license has been
revoked; (2) in the discretion of the Commission, a license or operation certificate has been suspended for a period greater than 120
days; or (3) a casino license has not been renewed. Such a system
which provides for the imposition of a conservatorship under the
aforementioned circumstances serves both the economic and law enforcement interests involved in casino gaming operations.
CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE HOUSING-1978 N.J.
Laws ch. 93 (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55C-58.1 to
-67).
The amendments to the Urban Renewal Corporation and Association Law of 1961, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55C-40 to -76 (West 1967
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& Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), provide for condominium development in
urban renewal areas. Although these developments will still be subject to the provisions of the old act, new requirements and tax
exemption guidelines have been established by the recently enacted
provisions.
Only a qualified "urban renewal corporation or association" is
now entitled to undertake a condominium project upon application to'
and approval by the governing body of the particular locality. Id. §§
40:55C-53, -55.1. A "project" is defined as "the undertaking and
execution of the redevelopment of a blighted area" pursuant to the
financial agreement executed between the corporation and municipality with respect to land and improvements. Id. § 40:55C-46. "Such
agreement shall be prepared by the corporation or association and
submitted as a separate part of its application for project approval."
Id. § 40:55C-59. In addition, the agreement shall "contain detailed
representations and covenants by the corporation or association as to
the manner in which it proposes to manage or operate the project."
Id. § 40:55C-62.
Tax exemption is extended to the "single condominium unit" as
well as to "all improvements in the project to be constructed or acquired by the corporation or association." Id. §§ 40:55C-58, -59.
However, unit exemption "shall continue in effect only during that
time that an owner of such unit . . . personally resides therein." Id.
§ 40:55C-58.
The amended act now provides for tax exempt status for certain
improvements made in the development of blighted areas. Such
status will be for a period of not more than twenty years. Id. §
40:55C-65. However, where the development involves housing, the
exemption period is extended to thirty-five years. Id. § 40:55C-65.
The new statute encourages improvement of blighted areas
through the construction of condominiums. Such improvement is
sorely needed in New Jersey's urban environments. Moreover, personal ownership of each condominium unit could lead to a greater
sense of pride in and commitment to the project by the individual
owners.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY-State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 396
A.2d 1129 (1979).
On October 7, 1975, at approximately 5:00 p.m., bartender Peter
Klimek started his shift at the Silver Moon Tavern in Clifton, New
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Jersey. Shortly thereafter, Thomas Stasio entered the tavern, approached the bartender and demanded some money. Klimek refused
and the defendant pulled out a knife. Klimek and another patron then
managed to wrestle Stasio to the ground.
At trial, after the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant
elected not to take the stand. His decision was as a result of an earlier conference in chambers, at which time Stasio's attorney advised
the court that his defense would be that the defendant had been so
intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the intent to rob. The
trial court responded by stating it would charge that "'voluntary
intoxication was not a defense to any act by the defendant in this
matter.' " 78 N.J. at 471, 396 A.2d at 1131. A jury found the defendant guilty of assault with the intent to rob, in violation of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:90-2 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), and of
assault while being armed with a dangerous knife, contrary to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-5 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
On appeal, the appellate division held that the trial court's declaration in view of the defendant's proffer of proof was erroneous, and
thus reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial. 78 N.J. at 472,
396 A.2d at 1131. The court reasoned that specific intent is an essential element of the crime of assault with intent to rob and that voluntary intoxication may be shown to negate that element of the offense.
The New Jersey supreme court subsequently granted certification. 75
N.J. 613, 384 A.2d 843 (1978).
In affirming the appellate division, the supreme court held that
the trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence of voluntary
intoxication at an unrecorded conference in chambers was improper.
78 N.J. at 483, 396 A.2d at 1137. The trial court should have waited
until the issue was reached at trial when evidence would have been
offered. The court also held that the trial judge should have instructed the jury on possession of a knife in terms of inferences which
may or may not be drawn rather than instructing that possession of a
knife was prima facie evidence of defendant's intent to commit a
crime with a dangerous instrument. Id. at 484-85, 396 A.2d at 1137.
The major issue addressed by the supreme court was whether
voluntary intoxication constitutes a defense to a crime, one element of
which is the defendant's intent. The court, speaking through Justice
Schreiber, held that they would follow the rule set forth in State v.
Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715 (1972), which held that criminal
responsibility was not extinguished when the offender was under the
influence of a drug or liquor. In Maik, Chief Justice Weintraub pronounced four exceptions to the general rule. First, criminal responsi-
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bility is eliminated where drugs which are being taken for medication
produce unexpected or bizarre results. Second, if intoxication so impairs a defendant's mental faculties that he does not possess the wilfulness, deliberation and premeditation necessary to prove first degree murder, a homicide cannot be raised to first degree murder.
Third, a felony homicide will be reduced to second degree murder
when intoxication precludes formation of the underlying felonious intent. Fourth, the defense of insanity is available when the voluntary
use of the intoxicant or drug results in a fixed state of insanity after
the influence of the intoxicant or drug has spent itself. For a more
detailed discussion of State v. Maik, see Note, 4 SETON HALL L.
REV. 295 (1972).
In reaching this holding, the court rejected the approach adopted
by the appellate division in State v. Del Vecchio, 142 N.J. Super.
359, 361 A.2d 579 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 501, 366 A.2d
657 (1976). The court in Del Vecchio held that when specific intent
was an element of an offense, voluntary intoxication may negate existence of that intent. Del Vecchio would permit the intoxication defense only when "specific" as distinguished from a "general" intent
was an element of the crime.
The Stasio court rejected that dichotomy, believing that the difference between the two is not readily ascertainable. The court
reasoned that the Del Vecchio approach may free defendants of
specific intent offenses even though the harm caused may be greater
than in an offense held to require only general intent. Thus, this
would "undermine the criminal law's primary function of protecting
society from the results of behavior that endangers the public safety."
78 N.J. at 477, 396 A.2d at 1134.
Technically, the impact of the holding in this case is minimal
because the new Code of Criminal Justice adopts its own provision
dealing with intoxication. Under that provision, proof of intoxication
may negate the existence of the defendant's purpose or knowledge,
when purpose or knowledge is an element of the crime. However,
the court points out that the legislature would be requested to modify
the provisions dealing with intoxication, so that the principle established in Maik would still be followed.
FAMILY LAW-ALIMONY-Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328,
398 A.2d 141 (App. Div. 1979).
Marilyn and Robert Lynn were married in 1963. They lived
together as husband and wife with their three children until Robert
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Lynn deserted their home in April 1975. At the time of his desertion,
Dr. Lynn was a successful medical specialist conducting a practice
devoted exclusively to the treatment of terminally ill cancer patients.
Subsequent to her husband's desertion, Mrs. Lynn instituted an action for separate maintenance and child support. When Dr. Lynn
counterclaimed for a divorce on grounds of adultery, Mrs. Lynn
amended her claim and sought a divorce on grounds of adultery and
desertion. In January 1976, the court entered a pendente lite support
order. Prior to the trial, Dr. Lynn sold his lucrative medical practice
and assumed a residency in a different specialty. He cited the depressing aspects of working in his original area of expertise as the reason
for his change in practice.
The trial court granted a judgment of dual divorce to the parties
on the grounds that Dr. Lynn had deserted the marital home and
Mrs. Lynn had engaged in post-desertion adultery. 153 N.J. Super.
377, 379 A.2d 1046 (Ch. Div. 1977). The trial court noted that fault
was an appropriate consideration in determining alimony under the
statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp.
1978-1979), and accordingly, denied Mrs. Lynn an alimony award
because of her conduct. In response to the other relief sought by the
parties to the action, the lower court entered a child support order
against Dr. Lynn and a directive that the marital assets be equitably
distributed.
Pursuant to the parties' cross-appeals, the appellate division considered the economic issues presented by the trial court's disposition
of the case. The appellate division disagreed with the lower court that
adulterous conduct was a per se bar to an award of alimony to the
adulterous spouse, especially where the "guilty" conduct had occurred after separation. 165 N.J. Super. at 335, 398 A.2d at 144. In
so doing, the court questioned the propriety of making adulterous
conduct an absolute prohibition to a grant of alimony, where the behavior was not of an "outrageous" nature. Id. Additionally, the court
justified its reluctance to support an automatic bar to alimony by a
provision incorporated into the recently enacted New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1-1 to :98-4 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979), which decriminalizes adultery and other consensual conduct between competent adults. The import of their analysis
was that adulterous fault is only one factor to be considered in the
alimony determination, and that an illicit affair should be viewed in
the context of the entire marriage.
Dr. Lynn also contended that the child support order was excessive. The trial court had imposed a trust upon his share of the equi-
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tably distributed marital assets, from which he was to fulfill his support obligation, and not upon his ex-wife's. The appellate division
ruled that he should be allowed access to the principal and interest in
the trust in excess of his child support obligation. 163 N.J. Super. at
342, 398 A.2d at 148. While the court did not hold that amount of
the obligation to be excessive, in view of the limited duration and
self-imposed aspect of Dr. Lynn's current reduction in income, the
court did direct the trial level to consider Mrs. Lynn's co-equal obligation to support their children. Id. at 344, 398 A.2d at 148. This
directive comported with the position of prior case law, that both
parents have an obligation to support their children. Additionally the
court rejected Dr. Lynn's contention that the trial level erred in including his interest in his former practice's accounts receivable and a
year's worth of deferred compensation in the marital assets available
for distribution. Id. Such amounts had accrued while the marital
union was intact.
By its instructions in Lynn, the appellate division has reaffirmed
recent trends in its family law decisions. The emphasis continues to
move away from the common law punitive approach to the denial of
alimony. Furthermore, the courts remain supportive of the proposition that child support is a coextensive responsibility of the parental
unit. Lastly, the Lynn holding contributes to the ongoing definitional
process of the parameters of the doctrine of equitable distribution
considered in Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974),
and Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
FAMILY LAW-ALIMONY AND MAINTENANCE-Pascarella v. Pascarella, 165 N.J. Super. 558, 398 A.2d 921 (App. Div. 1979).
The Pascarellas were married for eight and one-half years when
Mrs. Pascarella sought and obtained a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. It was the second marriage for each party and although
both had children from their previous marriage, no children were
born of this marriage. The trial court awarded the equivalent of forty
percent of the marital property at its then current market value as
equitable distribution. In addition, the court awarded permanent
alimony, and $8,800.00 in counsel fees. The husband appealed.
The appellate division held that the trial judge gave "undue
weight to 'the education of the plaintiff, present non-employability,
and her mental condition"' in awarding forty percent of the marital
property while not considering other relevant criteria. 165 N.J.
Super. at 562, 398 A.2d at 923. The court included among these the
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fact that it was a second marriage, of short duration, from which no
children were born. Id. In addition, the court noted that the wife had
brought no property or money to the marriage. Accordingly, the
court remanded on the issue of equitable distribution for reconsideration in light of the enumerated criteria. Id.
The court went on to hold that a debt of some $33,000.00 incurred by the husband during the marriage was a debt of the marriage and should be deducted from the total value of the marital
property in assessing the net value of the marital assets subject to
equitable distribution. Id. at 563, 398 A.2d at 923. The court upheld
the trial court in utilizing the current market value of the marital
home. It reasoned that although the husband had acquired the property prior to the marriage, his execution of a deed conveying it to
himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety constituted a gift. Id.
at 564, 398 A.2d at 924. Thus, it became marital property subject to
equitable distribution. Finally, the court ordered a review of the
award of alimony in light of the relation it may have borne to the
vacated equitable distribution. Id. at 565, 398 A.2d at 924. The court
also ordered review of the amount of counsel fees awarded in light of
the substantial portion of the matrimonial estate awarded to the wife.
Id.
The appellate division's opinion has significant implications for
several areas of matrimonial law. It provides further evidence of the
developing judicial trend to look at the totality of the circumstances
in dealing with matrimonial matters. It reaffirms the development,
and supports the conclusion, that the trial court must address the
equities which adhere to the husband as well as those of the wife.
The criteria thus proposed for reconsideration of the equitable distribution suggest that the mere fact of a marriage may no longer be
considered as conveying an entitlement to a wife; it must be a situational determination.
Two of the more noteworthy aspects of the opinion involve the
award of counsel fees and the valuation of the marital home. The
court is correct in its suggestion that, as to the fees, the award demands examination of the total context and is not a matter of right.
The logical inference to be drawn is that a lesser award may be warranted when a wife has been sufficiently compensated by the equitable distribution.
The other point of note, however, causes some concern. The
court was correct, as a matter of black letter law, in holding that the
husband's conveyance of the property to himself and his wife made it
marital property subject to equitable distribution. Such an interpreta-
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tion is questionable when considering the fact that the conveyance
was made presumptively during a happier period of the marital relationship. One may also presume that its reference was to estate and
not divorce considerations. The holding as to this issue, it seems, may
inhibit those persons involved in a marriage who are concerned with
minimizing the tax impact for their spouse upon their death. This
would be an unfortunate result, and hopefully, a line of case law will
not develop supporting it.
FAMILY LAW-STANDING-Doe v. State, 165 N.J. Super. 392, 398
A.2d 562 (App. Div. 1979).
John and Jane Doe were the foster parents of five-year-old D.W.
who was brought into their custody at the age of eight months when
D.W.'s natural mother attempted to murder her. Three years after
obtaining custody, the Does filed suit to restrain increased visitation
of D.W. by her natural parents, and to terminate their parental
rights. Additionally, the foster parents sought to adopt D.W. or in
the alternative, to obtain guardianship of the child. The Division of
Youth and Family Services (DYFS) determined unilaterally that D.W.
should be removed from the custody of the plaintiffs and returned to
her natural parents. The action was dismissed and the matter was
appealed to the appellate division which has exclusive jurisdiction to
consider an attack on a final administrative determination. N.J.R.
2 :2 -3(a)(2).
DYFS contended that foster parents lacked standing to contest
the decision. However, the court determined that prior case law did
not stand for the proposition "that foster parents lack[ed] standing or
a protected interest whereby they are not entitled to be heard prior
to an administrative determination concerning the removal of a foster
child." 165 N.J. Super. at 403, 398 A.2d at 567. Rather, the prior
cases denied the hearing based on the facts of the specific case. The
court noted that the purpose of the recent enactment of the Child
Placement Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-50 to -65 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), was to "provide for both administrative and
judicial review of each child's placement outside its home by DYFS
in order to ensure that each placement is in the best interests of the
child." 165 N.J. Super. at 404, 398 A.2d at 568. The court further
indicated that notice of the hearing as contemplated by the act included notice to the foster parents.
The appellate division, recognizing the state's liberal view on
standing, held that there was no reason why the standing of foster
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parents should be treated more restrictively. Furthermore, the court
held that where a bona fide dispute exists between the two sets of
parents, it is in the best interests of the child to grant foster parents
adversary standing "with all the rights which that status implies." Id.
As part of their standing, the plaintiffs have the right to discovery, to
present witnesses on their behalf, and to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses. Since DYFS was the agency whose decision was
being challenged, DYFS should not represent the child, but rather,
independent representation would be required. Furthermore, while
the hearing would normally be conducted by DYFS, the division has
become "so enmeshed in the proceeding" that it could not remain
impartial. Id. at 409, 398 A.2d at 570. Thus, pursuant to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4C-61 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), the juvenile and
domestic relations court would hold the hearing. Id.
The decision of the court further advances the position that the
best interests of the child should be paramount in custody and
placement proceedings. By allowing the foster parents to have standing in the juvenile and domestic relations court, the state is insuring
that the placement will be the best possible for the child. For a general discussion of standing of foster parents and the best interests of
the child, see Boskey & McCue, Alternative Standardsfor the Termination of Parental Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1978).
FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC LAW-ADVERTISING-SAFETY
LAWS-N.J. ADMIN. CODE

§§ 8:70-1.1 to -1.4 (1979).

The Prescription Drug Price and Quality Stabilization Act (Act),
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:6E-1 to -13 (West Cum. Supp.19 7 8 -19 7 9),

permits the advertising of prescription drug prices and creates a Drug
Utilization Review Council (Council) to prepare a list of interchangeable drug products. The Act's purpose is to encourage the substitution of less expensive, but therapeutically equivalent, "generic"
drugs for more expensive brand name drugs.
The Review Council "Formulary," as the list is to be known, will
be made public through free distribution to physicians, authorized
drug prescribers and licensed pharmacists. Upon request, the Formulary will be made available to the general public at cost.
The newly created Council has proposed rules, governing drug
evaluation, and acceptance criteria in order to assemble the Formulary. For a drug product to be included in the interchangeable list, it
must meet both the minimum standards of the Food and Drug Administration or other national, non-governmental drug clearing
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houses, as well as the "equivalence" guidelines of the new rules. N.J.
A.C. §§ 8:70-1.1 to -1.4. Additionally, the active and inactive components of the drug, together with their specific purpose and source
must be identified. Id. § 8:70-1.4(a). The product's ingredients,
sources and final dosage form are to be approved by either the Food
and Drug Administration, Drug Utilization Review Council or New
Jersey Department of Health before the drug can be accepted into
the Formulary. Id. If such information is not given, the drug will not
be approved. Id.
The manufacturer must also comply with the rules by identifying
itself and certifying that the product conforms to applicable standards.
The Council's rules attempt to ensure that the manufacturer, labeler
or distributor of the drug will be responsible by requiring compliance
with the "Good Manufacturing Practices" of title 21 of the United
States Code. The manufacturer's production facilities "must be inspected not less than every two years by an appropriate Federal or
State agency . . ." N.J.A.C. § 8:70-1.4(c)(1). Any violations discovered
by post inspection are to be made available to the Council, together
with records of previous product recalls. Id. § 8:70-1.4(c)(2). The
manufacturer must place an identification mark on its labels, inserts
and catalogues, be prepared to adequately handle returned products
if a recall is necessary, and have sufficient capabilities to ensure the
statewide availability of its product. N.J.A.C. § 8:70-1.4(d), (e), (g).
These rules provide an essential framework for the implementation of consumer-oriented legislation. The spiralling costs of
health and medical care can be obviated through the use of "generic"
products if the public is satisfied that the safety and quality of such
products is equivalent to name brand goods.
HOUSING -CONTRACTS -CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-1978 N.J. Laws
ch. 139 (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-61.13).
As a direct consequence of the enactment of the Casino Control
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 to -152 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979),
and the introduction of casino gambling in Atlantic City, property
located in Atlantic City has increased markedly in value. In an attempt to capitalize on this windfall, many landlords are in the process
of converting their properties to vacation-oriented structures such as
hotels and motels. The immediate impact of this metamorphosis has
been an acute housing shortage, as well as the dislocation of senior
citizens and persons of moderate and low income. In an attempt to
provide for this potential dilemma, the New Jersey legislature estab-
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lished grounds for evicting tenants and lessees of certain residential
property in the Atlantic City area. 1978 N.J. Laws ch. 139 (to be
codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.13).
Primarily, the statute's objective is to protect the common good.
The legislature fears that the displacement of Atlantic City residents
"'will force many of them into substandard housing, . . . and encourage overcrowding and the blighting of residential neighborhoods."
1979 N.J. Laws ch. 139, § 1(g). It has thus established a scheme by
which adequate relocation assistance is provided by the landlord. In
the event comparable housing is unavailable, the landlord is required
to tender the equivalent of five months rent to the tenant or allow
the lessee to remain in the building rent-free for a period of five
months beyond the initial notice of permanent retirement, which
notice must be afforded a tenant one year prior to eviction.
The legislature has expressed an intent to combat a social problem expansive in scope. Although the concerns manifested in this
enactment are undoubtedly real, a question remains as to the constitutionality of the means adopted to accomplish its end-housing stability. The relocation assistance provision must be evaluated in light
of the due process clause of the federal constitution, as well as the
contracts clause, which has been the subject of two recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. of New York
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). Under article I, section 10, the
state is prevented from impairing contractual obligations. Since the
New Jersey enactment requires landlords to provide notice of retirement and relocation assistance, as well as rent free residence or
specified payments to the tenant, the lease agreement terms have
been altered. Whether this modification rises to the point of unconstitutional impairment should be the subject of judicial scrutiny. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1978).
Facially, the current enactment appears to effect a severe, substantial and unreasonable alteration of the landlord-tenant agreement.
Its validity, however, will depend upon the standard against which
the enactment is assessed. Under United States Trust Co. of New
York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the legislation would have to
satisfy the reasonable and necessary construct articulated therein, although deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and
necessity might be allowed. Id. at 23-25. The more recent Allied
decision, however, avoided the United test in sustaining a contract
clause challenge. 438 U.S. at 250. Consequently, it is uncertain which
approach the courts would invoke. It is for this reason that the question of the enactment's constitutionality with regard to the contract
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clause is currently unanswerable. For a more detailed discussion of
the Allied and United cases and their effect upon the contract clause,
see Note 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 784 (1978).
Another constitutional safeguard encroached upon by the relocation assistance measure is the due process clause. Pursuant to the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, the state is prohibited from depriving an individual of his property without due process of law. The
denial by the state of the landlord's freedom to dispose of his building
as he sees fit seems to suggest an infringement of this fundamental
liberty. Additionally, the lack of a procedural mechanism by which
the landlord can challenge the unilateral imposition of the relocation
assistance provisions also smacks of a procedural due process violation.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY-NEGLIGENCE-Donch v. Delta Inspection Servs., Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 567, 398 A.2d 925 (Law Div.
1979).
Kenneth Donch was employed by Delta Inspection Services
(Delta), an independent contractor hired by Exxon Corporation (Exxon) to inspect suction lines and underwater pipes at an Exxon salt
water pumping station. Delta received from Exxon general safety instructions which were routinely issued to independent contractors.
However, Exxon provided no specific instructions regarding diving
operations. Donch was wearing complete diving gear when he
drowned while working underwater on December 18, 1976.
Margaret Donch brought suit individually and as administratrix
of her son's estate. She claimed Exxon had primary liability for the
wrongful death by not providing Kenneth Donch with a reasonably
safe place to work, for negligently failing to supervise Donch, and for
negligently employing an independent contractor who failed to
adequately supervise the underwater inspection. Plaintiff also asserted
the vicarious liability of Exxon for the negligence of Delta in carrying
on an inherently dangerous activity. Since Mrs. Donch failed to introduce evidence to support her allegations of the defendant's primary liability, the court addressed the vicarious liability issue.
In Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti Construction Co., 30
N.J. 425, 149 A.2d 288 (1959), the supreme court stated the general
rule that one who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the
contractor's negligence. An exception exists when the work is inherently dangerous, can be "carried on safely only by the exercise of
special skill and care, and which involves grave risk of danger to persons or property if negligently done." Id. at 435, 149 A.2d at 293
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(quoting from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 835(b)). In such a case, the
employer may not absolve himself of liability for the independent
contractor's negligence. Majestic Realty had been concerned with the
vicarious liability of a landowner whose contractor's negligent excavation work resulted in damage to adjacent property. The court recognized the inherent danger exception where there existed a high degree of harm to members of the public, adjoining proprietors of land,
or other third parties.
Donch presented an issue of first impression in the statewhether the employee of an independent contractor can be included as an injured "member of the public" or "third party" in a
vicarious liability suit based on the inherent danger exception. 165
N.J. Super. at 571, 398 A.2d at 927. The court held that the inherent
danger exception cannot be extended to employees of an independent
contractor. Id. at 575, 398 A.2d at 929. A general contractor who
sublets work relinquishes the right of control and direction over the
manner in which the work shall be done, and exercises supervisory
powers only to the extent that the subcontractor's performance is ensured. The court went on to say that only the subcontractor has the
duty to protect its employees from the very hazards that arise from
performance of the contracted work. Id. at 573-74, 398 A.2d at 928.
The general contractor can safely assume that the subcontractor and
its employees are possessed of sufficient skill to recognize the degree
of danger involved and to adjust their methods of work accordingly.
An extension of the inherent danger exception would also frustrate the intended operation of the workers' compensation system by
allowing the injured employee both a compensation award and a right
of action based on vicarious liability. The legislature, in creating the
compensation system, assured a single and sufficient employee remedy. Since the insurance policy out of which the compensation is to
be paid is carried by the worker's own employer, it is unnecessary to
hold the general contractor liable because insurance costs will be included by the subcontractor in its contract price. The compensation is
ultimately borne by the general contractor.
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